India has ruled out purchasing new-build Russian Su-57 fighters in the near term, closing the most obvious channel for Moscow to sell its flagship stealth jet to New Delhi. Defence Secretary Rajesh Kumar Singh said India had “not thought about” acquiring a new Sukhoi variant, telling reporters the country was instead pursuing further upgrades to its existing, licence-built Su-30MKI fleet, which he described as a successful and important platform. The remark is the clearest official signal yet against a near-term Su-57 purchase, a sharper stance than the ambiguity officials had maintained earlier this year.
A Programme Foreclosed by Precedent
The decision carries the weight of an earlier failure. India withdrew in 2018 from the joint Russian-Indian Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft programme, based on an earlier Su-57 variant, after prolonged disputes over cost-sharing, industrial workshare, technology access and the aircraft’s engine and stealth performance. That collapse left New Delhi wary of tying its fifth-generation ambitions to a Russian design a second time, a caution now reinforced by Moscow’s own reduced capacity to deliver on schedule.
New Delhi’s chosen path is the “Super Sukhoi” upgrade programme, valued at roughly $7.5 billion. Its first phase will modernise 84 Su-30MKIs with the indigenous Virupaaksha AESA radar, a larger, Gallium Nitride-based derivative of the Uttam radar under development for the Tejas fighter, alongside new electronic-warfare systems and mission computers. The aircraft already carries the extended-range, air-launched BrahMos missile, and DRDO began fabricating the first Virupaaksha prototype in early 2026, with flight trials projected for 2028. Upgrading a proven, already-inducted fleet limits the risk of committing to another Russian-origin programme at a moment when Moscow’s defence industry is stretched by sanctions and wartime production demands.
A Narrowing Field of Options
India’s choice also reflects a shrinking menu of fifth-generation alternatives. The F-35 remains available only through Washington’s government-controlled Foreign Military Sales process, which constrains both timeline and technology-sharing terms. Europe’s Franco-German-Spanish FCAS programme collapsed in June after Dassault and Airbus failed to resolve a dispute over control of the fighter’s development, while the British-Italian-Japanese GCAP programme remains active, targeting service entry in 2035. Against that backdrop, India is layering additional Rafales — 114 aircraft, according to Reuters — onto its own Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft programme, with the Rafale MRFA procurement receiving preliminary government approval in February.
A Thin Combat Record
Underlying these calculations is a jet that has yet to prove itself in the war Russia is actually fighting. Russia had only four Su-57s in frontline service when the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in 2022, and still fields fewer than three dozen today, a slow production pace that has kept the type largely out of Ukrainian airspace. Ukraine’s military intelligence agency, GUR, said it struck a Su-57 with a drone on the ground at Akhtubinsk airfield in June 2024, publishing satellite images it said confirmed the strike; a second aircraft was reportedly damaged in a similar strike in April 2026, though that case is less firmly documented. A separate Su-57 crashed near Moscow in July 2026, with the pilot ejecting safely; Russian military bloggers have speculated the cause was friendly fire from the country’s own air defences, though this remains unconfirmed. No Su-57 has been shot down in air-to-air combat, and the open-source loss-tracking project Oryx has visually confirmed only one Su-57 loss to date.
Russia remains indispensable to sustaining India’s existing Russian-origin arsenal, built up over decades and impossible to replace quickly. But its position as the default supplier for India’s next major platform is weakening on the numbers: SIPRI recorded a 64% drop in Russian arms exports between 2016–20 and 2021–25, and Russia’s share of Indian arms imports fell over the same period from 51% to 40%. India’s Su-57 decision does not end the relationship, but it confirms that inherited dependence no longer guarantees Moscow the next contract.
